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200 MPH Cigarette Ads: A Comparison of
International Restrictions on Tobacco
Sports Sponsorship
By RANDALL H. STONER*
Member of the Class of 1992
"Gentlemen start your engines!" These famous words traditionally
start the Indianapolis 500. They also ring out at race tracks across the
world to signal the start of other races. Almost every weekend from
February to November, races put on by the major motorsports sanction-
ing bodies-FISA (Federation Internationale du Sport Automobile),
NASCAR (National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing), CART
(Championship Auto Racing Teams), IMSA (International Motor Sports
Association), AMA (American Motorcyclist Association), and NHRA
(National Hot Rod Association)--draw huge crowds to race tracks
throughout the world. The race fans come to see sleek Porsche 962 GTP
cars race around the clock at the IMSA Daytona 24 Hour. They come to
see Lola Indy cars turn 225 mile-per-hour lap speeds during the Indian-
apolis 500 and to see multi-million dollar Ferrari Formula One Grand
Prix cars race at tracks from Europe to Brazil to Japan. The crowds
come to watch Chevrolet Luminas and Ford Thunderbirds race door-
handle to doorhandle on short-tracks throughout the southeast United
States. They come to see 300 mile-per-hour top fuel dragsters and 180
mile-per-hour superbike motorcycles.
The crowds come to the tracks for the noise, the excitement, and the
thrills of high speed motorsport competition. The crowds find one more
thing at the track. From NASCAR's Winston Cup series to IMSA's
* B.A., California State University, Northridge, 1989. The author was the recipient of
the Albert G. Evans Award in Private Enterprise for this Note. The author wishes to thank
the library staffs at University of California, Hastings College of the Law; University of Cali-
fornia, Boalt Hall; and the Library of Congress. The author also desires to thank Laurelle
Kennedy of the Embassy of Australia, Washington, D.C. and Dr. Peter Frost of the Depart-
ment of Sport and Recreation, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. The author especially thanks
his parents for their support and for introducing him to motorsports. The author is an inveter-
ate motorsports fan and all his comments should be read in light of this known prejudice.
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Camel GT, and from Marlboro-sponsored Indy cars to Lucky Strike-
sponsored motorcycles, the race fans find cigarette advertising.
Since tobacco advertising was banned from the United States air-
waves in the early 1970s,1 the tobacco companies have searched for alter-
nate methods to keep their cigarette brand names before the public eye.
One of their most successful methods has been the sponsorship of sport-
ing activities. This sponsorship includes billboards at the stadiums,2 per-
sonal service contracts with individual athletes,3 and sponsorship of
sports series such as the Virginia Slims Women's Tennis Tour.4
Tobacco sponsorship is perhaps most visible in the realm of motor-
sports. The tobacco companies often sponsor individual racers, such as
Indianapolis 500 winner Emerson Fittipaldi.5 They sponsor race teams,
like the Marlboro McLaren Formula One Team. 6 The sponsorship
ranges from individual races, for example the Marlboro Grand Prix,7 to
entire racing series, such as the NASCAR Winston Cup series8 and
Camel Super-Cross motorcycle racing.9
The high visibility of tobacco logos and trademarks in televised
sports is a way of circumventing the ban on televislion commercials for
tobacco products.10 Consequently, several countries have barred the dis-
play of tobacco brand names in televised sports. Canada has banned
1. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1988)).
2. All but two major league baseball stadiums have cigarette billboards. Jason DeParle,
Cigarette Wars Move to a New Arena, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, § 4, at 5.
3. A personal service contract is a contract between a sponsor and an individual athlete
wherein the athlete participates in advertising for the sponsor. The advertising may involve
endorsement of the sponsor's product or personal appearances by the athlete at events promot-
ing the sponsor.
4. DeParle, supra note 2, at 5. Sports sponsored by tobacco companies include: Auto-
mobile Racing-Camel, Winston, Marlboro, Skoal, Kodiac, Levi Garrett, Copenhagen,
Rothmans, Silk Cut, Gitanes, West, HB; Motorcycle Racing-Camel, Marlboro, Chesterfield,
Lucky Strike, Rothmans, Gauloises; Speedboat Racing--Lucky Strike; Skiing-Marlboro,
Newport, Camel; Golf-Vantage, Premier; Tennis-Virginia Slims, Marlboro; Sailing-Sa-
lem, Marlboro; Soccer-Marlboro, Camel; Bowling-Lucky Strike; Horse Racing-Marl-
boro; Baseball-Winston, Marlboro; and Fishing-Skoal, Red Man. Tobacco Product
Education and Health Protection Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, Part 1, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1990) (The DOC Tobacco-Sports Score-
card, attachment to statement of Alan Blum, M.D., founder of Doctors Ought to Care).
5. CART Who's Who, ON TRACK, April 5, 1990, at 36.
6. Formula 1 Who's Who, ON TRACK, Mar. 22, 1990, at 21.
7. Mark Tapscott, Is Motorsports Coming to the End of Tobaco Road? Drive to Ban All
Tobacco Advertising Regains Momentum, AUToWEEK, May 16, 1988, at 44.
8. Id.
9. Luken Lights Up Hearing Room Over Tobacco Ads, BROADCASTING, May 7, 1990, at
55 [hereinafter Luken Lights Up Hearing].
10. See Alan Blum, Get Tobacco Ads Out of Stadiums, Off TV, USA TODAY, Aug. 22,
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sponsorship in the name of tobacco brands.11 In Germany' 2 and Great
Britain13 regulations restrict the display of cigarette logos in televised
sports. France14 and the United States 5 have considered laws which
would restrict tobacco sponsorship. The European Economic Commu-
nity is considering a complete ban on tobacco advertising to take effect in
1993.16
This Note addresses the use of tobacco sponsorship in sports, focus-
ing on motorsports. The Note discusses two bills that have been intro-
duced in the United States and investigates the constitutionality of a
complete ban on tobacco company sports sponsorship in the United
States. The Note then examines the approaches used in Canada, Great
Britain, and Australia. The Note discusses the possible effect on motor-
sports of a complete ban and the alternatives and then recommends the
approach the United States should follow to address tobacco company
involvement in sports.
I. SPORTS SPONSORSHIP
Sports sponsorship may be defined as an "agreement under which
one of the parties (the sponsor) supplies materials, financial or other ben-
efits to another (the sponsored) in exchange for its association with a
sport or sportsman... for advertising, especially television advertising
purposes."1 7 Sponsorship is distinct from patronage because sponsorship
1990, News, at 15. See also Luken Lights Up Hearing, supra note 9, at 55 and De Parle, supra
note 2, at 5.
11. Tobacco Products Control Act, ch. 20, 11 C. Gaz. 393 (1988) (Can.).
12. Lebensmittel und Bedarfsgegenstindegesetz (Foodstuffs and Goods in Daily Use Act)
§ 22, 1974 BGBI. I 1945, amendments reported at 1986 BGBI. 1 2610, 1987 BGBI. 1I 2610
(F.RG.) [hereinafter LMBG].
13. Voluntary Agreement between the Government and the Tobacco Industry on Sports
Sponsorship to stand at least until 31/10/1989 [hereinafter Voluntary Agreement] (attached as
annex to DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, FIRST REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE FOR MONITORING AGREEMENTS ON TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND SPONSORSHIP
(1988) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT]).
14. See Michela Wrong, French Ban on Tobacco Advertising Panics Sporting World,
REuTERS LImRARY REPORT, Mar. 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lbyrpt File.
15. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
16. See Paul L. Montgomery, Europe Sets New Standards for TVPrograms, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1989, at Dl. The European Parliament has voted for a blanket ban on tobacco
advertising in the European Community. This would include a ban on sports sponsorship. EC
Parliament Approves Tobacco Advertising Ban, WALL ST. L, Feb. 12, 1992, at A16.
17. STEPHEN TOWNLEY & EDWARD GRAYSON, SPONSORSHIP OF SPORT, ARTS AND
LEISURE: LAW, TAx AND BusINESs RELATIONSHIPS 4 (1984) (quoting definition by the
Council of Europe from the third Conference of European Ministers responsible for sport, held
in Palma, Majorca in 1981).
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is a commercial relationship."8 The sponsor's objective is the promotion
of his or her business.19 This objective is absent in patronage where the
benefit supplied by the patron is a gift.2" A sponsor may be promoting a
product, service, or the company's image.21 The sponsor's association
may be with an individual, an event, or other aspects of the sport.22
Sponsorships are essential in professional motorsports. Motorsports
are extremely expensive, especially at the highest level such as the
Formula One World Championship and the major series in the United
States, the CART Indy Car and NASCAR Winston Cup series. The
average annual budget of a Formula One team is fifteen million dollars
and the top teams may spend twice that.23  Honda has about 150 engi-
neers and designers working on their Formula One engine projects and is
reported to spend more than 100 million dollars a year participating in
Grand Prix racing.' The drivers themselves receive salaries which rival
those of other athletes. Three-time Formula One World Champion
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id at 13.
21. Id. at 5. Sponsors have been defined as "[i]nvestors with [an] unlimited supply of
decals, 'gimme caps,' banners and money who hitch their future to a race car in order to sell
more beer, auto parts, cereal, soap, film or tobacco." Frank J. Murray, Definitely Definitive
NASCAR Definitions, WASH. TIMFS, Feb. 20, 1992, at E2.
22. TOWNLEY & GRAYSON, supra note 17, at 5. In a promotional piece, NASCAR listed
seventeen popular methods of sponsorship. They are: Sponsorship of a car; Sponsorship of a
driver; Car-and-driver combined sponsorship; Track sponsorship; Family-night sponsorship;
Series sponsorship; Single-event sponsorship; Lap sponsorship; High performance sponsorship;
Trackside-billboard advertising; Program advertising; Prize-money sponsorship; Trophy-and-
award sponsorship; Corporate hospitality-area sponsorship; VIP-suite sponsorship; Grand-
stand-section sponsorship; and Sponsorship of ironic occurrences. THOMAS L. HARRIS, THE
MARKETER'S GUIDE TO PUBLIC RELATIONS 204-05 (1991) (quoting The Art of Moving Prod-
ucts at 200 MPH, NASCAR Inc., promotional flyer).
23. Mark Fogarty, Only Big Companies Play This Game, USA TODAY, May 25, 1990, at
E15. See also John Holusha, A New Fast Lanefor Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1987, at DI.
A typical Formula One team will employ about one hundred people. These include about
seventeen engineers, thirty-five fabricators, four inspectors, twenty-six mechanics, and twelve
administrators. Ia The team will build seven cars for a year's raring and go through about
forty engines and 120 engine rebuilds with an annual engine manufacturing cost of $9,368,640.
Id. The team will spend over $15 million for a year's racing. This includes about $5 million for
driver retainers, $3.25 million for wages, $1.5 million for equipment, not including engines,
$3.5 million in travelling expenses, and $1.5 million for testing. Id. The team's income in-
cludes about $5 million from the primary sponsor, $3.25 million from the engine supplier, $2.5
million from its oil company, and $3.25 million from subsidiary sponsors. The team can also
receive another $2 million in prize money and television rights. Id. This does not include the
amounts that drivers receive from their personal sponsors. World champion Ayrton Senna Is
said to receive $5 million from Brazil's Nacional Bank for his personal sponsorship. Full Chat:
Senna Stays With McLaren, ON TRACK, Sept. 20, 1990, at 6.
24. John Steinbreder, Money Fuels the Honda Wonder, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 21,
1989, at 58.
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Ayrton Senna's 1991 salary was said to be between fifteen and twenty
million dollars.25
In order to pay these expenses, the race teams sell sponsorships to
advertisers. Even small decals on Formula One cars are sold to advertis-
ers for 500,000 dollars. The prime advertising space on the car can be
worth ten million dollars.2 6 Marlboro alone spends about fifty million
dollars per year on Formula One sponsorship and associated
advertising.27
Sponsorship buys a great deal of visibility for the sponsor. Formula
One's annual television audience is over one billion viewers worldwide.28
Eighty-eight million people attend motor races annually, placing racing
behind only baseball in attendance.29 In 1990 over 12 million people at-
tended races in the United States, an increase of over 800,000 spectators
from 1989.30 The Coca-Cola 600 and the Indianapolis 500, each held
over the Memorial Day weekend, are the two best attended single sport-
ing events in the United States.31
Motorsports fans are not only numerous, they are also "fiercely
loyal" to products.3 2 According to one survey, sixty-one percent of race
fans say their buying decisions "would be influenced by a company's sup-
port of motorsports."' 3 Similarly, a survey by the J. Walter Thompson
advertising agency found that many fans will buy only brands produced
by companies that sponsor racing and will go without if that brand is not
available.' One commentator has written that race fans "will fight you
for their brand of beer, their brand of cigarettes."35 Sponsorship is a very
cost-effective method of advertising. Tom Cotter, president of Cotter
Communications, said:
To advertise for 30 seconds on NBC's Bill Cosby Show costs 250,000
dollars. Now a million bucks spent in NASCAR will get you a mid-
dle-of-the-pack Winston Cup team, a team that will generate literally
hours of exposure on national television for thirty races throughout the
25. Full Chat Senna Stays With McLaren, supra note 23, at 6.
26. Fogarty, supra note 23, at 15.
27. Id
28. Id
29. Ellie Boudrow, Driven to Succeed, Bus. J. CHARLOTTE, July 2, 1990, § 1, at 8.
30. Full Chat Goodyear Shows Annual Increase, ON TRACK, Jan. 25, 1991, at 12.
31. Boudrow, supra note 29, at 8 (quoting Al Pearce, sportswriter for the Newport News,
Va., Daily Press/Times Herald).
32. Id
33. Dutch Mandel, RacingforDollar" Corporate America Likes the Return on Investment
in Motorsports, AUTOWEEK, Dec. 4, 1989, at 61 [hereinafter Racing for Dollars].
34. Boudrow, supra note 29, at 8.
35. Id (quoting AI Pearce).
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year. And it will do so for the cost of two minutes of national
advertising.
36
In addition to exposure on the track, sponsorship can influence clients
and customers in other ways. Sponsoring businesses use the races as an
opportunity to wine and dine their clients. Businesses also use racers and
race cars for promotional events in stores. 7
II. TOBACCO AND MOTORSPORTS
Tobacco companies have been leaders in developing racing sponsor-
ship. They spend an estimated seventy-five million dollars on motor rac-
ing in the United States. 38 Analysts say that "[i]n the last 20 years, no
participant has had deeper pockets or a more reliable financial commit-
ment [to motorsports] than the tobacco companies."
'39
Tobacco companies sponsor motorsports because of the broad expo-
sure that the events provide. Dan Oxberry of Phillip Morris, manufac-
turer of Marlboro, the best selling cigarette brand and a major sponsor of
motor racing,' said that "Marlboro is one of the best known brands in
the world and racing is a sport watched by millions in many countries.
But it's almost coincidental [that we sponsor] Formula One. If there was
a world international tiddly winks championship I'm sure we would con-
sider that as much."41 RJR/Nabisco has boasted about its "leadership in
sports marketing."42 The company claimed that, during 1986, "an esti-
mated 25 million spectators attended the more than 1,400 events spon-
sored by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco U.S.A. The company is a leading
corporate sponsor of American motor sports-stock cars, sports cars,
drag racing, and motorcycle racing."
4 3
Through motorsports sponsorship, the tobacco companies reach the
television audience. Since the 1970s, cigarette advertising has been
36. Dutch Mandel, Autopower in the 90's; Advertising & Marketing The Persuaders, AU-
TOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 29, 1989, at 120.
37. Racing for Dollars, supra note 33, at 61.
38. Jonathan Ingram, The Tobacco Question, ON TRACK, May 3, 1990, at 50. The six
largest cigarette manufacturers and the three largest smokeless tobacco companies have in-
creased the amount spent on sports marketing from $63 million in 1984 to $134 million In
1991. Bruce Horovitz, Phillip Morris' Deal to Get in Driver's Seat; To Obtain Auto Race Spon-
sorship, Tobacco Firm Agrees to Advise Kids Not to Smoke, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at DI.
39. Id.
40. DAVID TUCKER, TOBACCO: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTivE 207 (1982).
41. Feona McEwan, Marketing and Advertising; Tobacco Rides a Rough Road, FIN,
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1986, § 1, at 12.
42. LARRY C. WHITE, MERCHANTS OF DEATH: THE AMERICAN TOBACCO INDUSTRY
124 (1988) (quoting RJR/Nabisco 1986 Annual Report).
43. Id.
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banned from television in several countries." Opponents of tobacco ad-
vertising see the exposure that cigarette companies receive at televised
sporting events45 as a way to circumvent this ban.' Critics also say that
sponsorship allows the cigarette manufacturers to "associate their prod-
uct with the things with which they'd wish it to be associated: Glamor,
health, vitality, success-rather than lung cancer, bronchitis and
emphysema."47
Motorsport sponsorship allows tobacco companies to reach the
blue-collar segment of the population which is most likely to smoke.43
The tobacco companies try to sponsor events which appeal to the sort of
person who will take the risk of smoking. They have become the "lead-
44. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 1335 ("After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise
cigarettes and little cigars on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission."). See also LMBG, supra note 12, § 22(1) ("Es ist
verboten, ffir Zigaretten, zigarettenhnliche Tabakerzeugnisse und Tabakerzeugnisse, die zur
Herstellung von Zigaretten durch den Verbraucher bestimmt sind, im Rundfunk oder im
Fernsehen zu werben.").
45. See, eg., Richard Woodman, 'Ban Cigarette Sport Sponsorship' Call, PRESS AsS'N
NEWSFiLE, Dec. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Panews File ("The BBC's cover-
age of the 1988 British Grand Prix gave Marlboro the equivalent of eighteen 30-second TV
advertisements because of the logos allowed on cars and participants, and signs behind the
track."). See also Luken Lights Up Hearing, supra note 9, at 55 (Tobacco company signs were
visible during 49% of NBC's coverage of the 1989 Marlboro Grand Prix Indy Car race);
Horovitz, supra note 38 (It is estimated that in 1991 Winston received the equivalent of S15.5
million in coverage. Cameras showed the Winston logo for over eleven hours and the Winston
name was mentioned by announcers 2,180 times.). But see STuART TURNER, PRACTICAL
SPONSORSHIP 95 (1987) ("[O]n no account try to equate that 14 minutes [of TV coverage] with
the same amount of paid-for airtime because, while you or your record keeper may have no-
ticed your banners for that long... is it likely that the general public will have studied them so
avidly?"). But see Laura Clark, Volvo Fights to Retain Premier Place in World of Tennis, AU-
TOMOTIVE NEws, June 12, 1989, at 49 ("In Volvo's view, a newspaper story on Volvo Tennis
is worth 30 percent of a newspaper ad of equal size").
46. David Eisner, Smoking Ads Seep Through Loopholes" Nations'Bans Lost in a Cloud of
Thin Disguises, CH. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1986, at C3.
47. Mda Representative Fortney Pete Stark (D-CA) blasted tobacco company sponsorships
by parodying the character of Mr. Subliminal, a Saturday Night Live character who uses sub-
liminal suggestions while speaking. The main text below is from the introduction to Phillip
Morris and the Arts, a book detailing Phillip Morris' involvement in arts sponsorship, and the
parentheticals are Representative Stark's additions as Mr. Subliminal:
The arts (along with tennis tournaments, stock car racing, and billboards in profes-
sional and college sports stadiums) have helped (allowed us to get around the prohi-
bition on television advertising) us (the Death Merchants) to appreciate (exploit)
creativity (talk about creativity, how'd you like those arguments in court- that ciga-
rette ads don't increase smoking?) in all forms (if deductible from our taxes) ....
137 Cong. Rec. E1460 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991).
48. See Phil Rabin & Carolyn Myles, Advertisers Discover Sports Deliver Male TV Piewers,
WASH. TiMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at D3 ("Along with bowling, the least upscale sports are baseball
and auto racing."). See also WHrrnE, supra note 42, at 163 ("[S]moking is rapidly becoming a
blue-collar phenomenon.").
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ing sponsors of events that appeal to risk-taking or rebellious adolescent
instincts: dirtbike, hotrod, and motorcycle racing.""' Sports sponsorship
by tobacco companies also "build[s] a constituency of thankful and finan-
cially dependent recipients who can often be relied on to support the
industry."50
Sponsorship of sports targets young people. 51 Teenagers see sports
stars as glamorous. 52 Tobacco companies use racers in material aimed
directly at teenagers. For example, United States Tobacco, manufacturer
of Skoal Bandit snuff, produced a driver's education film starring Harry
Gant who drives a Skoal sponsored car in the NASCAR Winston Cup
series.5 3 The car in the film had plainly visible Skoal sponsorship
decals.54
Children are particularly susceptible to tobacco sponsorship. In
England, despite the fact that cigarette advertising has been banned from
television since 1965,"1 more than seventy percent of the children ques-
tioned by one poll believed cigarettes were still advertised on television.56
Another British study has found that the children surveyed were most
aware of the cigarette brands which were most closely associated with
sponsored televised sporting events.57
The television exposure of motor racing has led many people to call
for a ban on tobacco company sports sponsorship.5" The proponents of
49. Daniel H. Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff" Persuasion, Pat rnalism, and Commercial
Speech, 56 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1205, 1215 n.41 (quoting Blum, supra note 4, at 271, 275).
50. Simon Chapman, Cigarette Advertising and Smoking: A Review of the Evidence, in
SMOKING OUT THE BARONS: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 79, 93
(1985). This is not necessarily always true. 500cc motorcycle grand prix star Kevin Schwantz
strongly opposes smoking despite being sponsored by Lucky Strike cigarettes. Joe Scalzo,
Yankee Cycle Dandies: Americans on Two Wheels Face Few Challenges in Grand Prix Bike
Competition, AUTOWEEK, Dec. 31, 1990, at 44. Perhaps more typical, however, is the reponse
of NASCAR racer Michael Waltrip, who wrote in defence of tobacco company sponsorship
that "[s]tudies have shown that advertising of tobacco products bad little if anything to do
with the decision by consumers to use the products." Michael Waltrip, R.J and the Racer,
AUTOWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 12. It should be noted, however, that the sponsor of Michael
Waltrip's race car is Pennzoil rather than any tobacco company. id.
51. 92 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 639 (1986) (Eng.).
52. Jason DeParle, Warning: Sports Stars May Be Hazardous to Your Health, WASH.
MONTHLY, Sept. 1989, at 34, 36.
53. WHITE, supra note 42, at 111.
54. Id.
55. 92 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) at 642.
56. Id. at 643.
57. Frank Ledworth, Does Tobacco Sports Sponsorship on Television Act as Advertising to
Children?, in SMOKING OUT THE BARONS: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TOBACCO INDUS-
TRY 173, 173 (1985).
58. See supra notes 11-16. See also Tobacco Products (Sports Sponsorship) Act 1985
(House of Commons Bill 53); Tobacco Products (Sports Sponsorship) Act 1986 (House of
[Vol, 15
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such a ban argue that it is necessary to prevent children from becoming
addicted to tobacco.5 9 Most smokers begin to smoke before adulthood. 6°
The Royal College of Physicians has reported that, "Learning to smoke
usually occurs in childhood or in adolescence. The matter is largely set-
tled by the age of 20; if a person is still a non-smoker at this age he is
unlikely to take it up."' 61 A document subpoenaed from Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco by the Federal Trade Commission illustrates how the
tobacco industry targets young people. The document advises the to-
bacco company on the advertising approach to take with children:
Thus, an attempt to reach young smokers, starters, should be based...
on the following major parameters:
* Present the cigarette as one of a few initiations into the adult world.
" Present the cigarette as part of the illicit pleasure category of prod-
ucts and activities.
* In your ads create a situation taken from the day-to-day life of the
young smoker but in an elegant manner have this situation touch on
the basic symbols of the growing-up, maturity process.
* To the best of your ability (considering some legal constraints), re-
late the cigarette to "pot", wine, beer, sex, etc.
* DON'T communicate health or health-related points.62
Cigarette smoking has been compared to statutory rape because young
people are too immature to understand fully the significance of smok-
ing.63 Significantly, the tobacco companies target young people even
though it is illegal in most states to sell cigarettes to those young
Commons Bill 44); Tobacco Product Education and Health Protection Act of 1990, S. 1883,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See also HHS Secretary Sullivan Responds to the Tobacco Insti.
tute's 'Major New Initiatives to Discourage Youth Smoking, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 11, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Prnews File (declaring that "[firom the Virginia Slims
tennis matches to the Marlboro auto races, millions of our youth are being victimized.").
59. Woodman, supra note 45.
60. Chapman, supra note 50, at 85. It is also argued that tobacco is a "gateway" drug
which leads to abuse of other, illegal, drugs. See 137 Cong. Rec. S6036, at S6047.
61. ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, SMOKING OR HEALTH: THE THIRD
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON 104 (1978), quoted in Chap-
man, supra note 50, at 85.
62. TED BATES & COMPANY, INC., WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM PEOPLE? A CON-
CEPTUAL SUMMARIZATION OF 18 Focus GROUP INTERVIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF SMOKING
(marketing report prepared for Brown & Williamson by one of its advertising agencies, Ted
Bates and Company, Inc., to assist in the preparation of a marketing campaign for Viceroy
cigarettes), quoted in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE AD-
VERTISING INVESTIGATION, Ch. 2, reprinted in Cigarette Adrertising and the HHSAnti.Smok-
ing Campaign, 1981. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 67 (1981).
63. ELIZABETH WHELAN, A SMOKING GUN: How THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY GETS
AWAY WITH MURDER 159 (1984).
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M. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
There have been several proposals designed to ban sports sponsor-
ship worldwide.65 In the United States two principal bills have been in-
troduced to restrict sports sponsorship: the Tobacco Control and Health
Protection Act and the Protect Our Children from Cigarettes Act.
The Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act 6 6 was introduced
in 1990 by Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) and joined by thirty
co-sponsors. 67 House Bill 5041, called for a complete prohibition of to-
bacco company sports sponsorship. The relevant sections declare that,
"No tobacco product advertisement shall be located-(A) in or on a
sports stadium or other sports facility or any other facility where sport-
ing activity is regularly performed, (B) on cars, boats, or other sporting
equipment used in or associated with any sporting event. ' ' 6' The bill fur-
ther provides that:
It shall be unlawful within the United States for the manufacturer,
packager, or distributor of tobacco products.., to sponsor or cause to
be sponsored any athletic, music, artistic, or other event in the name of
a tobacco product trademark or in a manner so that a tobacco product
trademark is publicly identified as a sponsor of, or in any way associ-
ated with, such an event .... [or] to pay or cause to be paid to have any
tobacco product trademark appear on any vehicle, boat, or any other
equipment used in sports.69
The restrictions in this bill are so extensive that all tobacco company
sports sponsorship would end regardless of whether the event was tele-
vised or not. Although H.R. 5041 failed to make it out of committee,70
both Representative Waxman and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA)
are expected to reintroduce bills calling for a ban on tobacco sports
sponsorship.71
The proposed Protect our Children from Cigarettes Act of 1989 also
64. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West Supp. 1990); Protection of Children (To-
bacco) Act, 1986, ch. 34 (Eng.).
65. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
66. H.R. 5041, supra note 15.
67. Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 5041, available in LEXIS, Govnews Library, Bitrack File.
68. H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 6(a)(3).
69. Id. § 6(b)(2), (5).
70. COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Oct. 4, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Comdly
File.
71. Robert P. Hey, Antismoking Forces Gear Up to Curtail Youth Tobacco Use, CIRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 14, 1990, at 4.
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would have restricted sports sponsorship.72 House Bill 1250, sponsored
by former Representative Thomas Luken (D-Ohio), declared that, "No
person may engage in the consumer sales promotion of any tobacco
product in or affecting commerce if that consumer sales promotion is or
may be seen or heard by any person under the age of 18."73 This bill
would have allowed "sponsorships of athletic, artistic, or other events
under the registered brand name of a tobacco product" only if "the
brand name is the name of a corporation in existence on August 1,
1988." 71 The bill would have prohibited "displaying the registered brand
name or logo of a tobacco product on cars, boats, animals, or other sport-
ing equipment... unless the brand name is the name of a corporation in
existence on August 1, 1988."71 This provision would allow sponsorship
in the name of a cigarette brand such as Phillip Morris which is the same
as the name of the corporation but would not allow sponsorship in the
name of Phillip Morris' best-selling brand Marlboro. Thus, the bill
would end sponsorship by the three brands most associated with motor-
sports in the United States (Marlboro, Winston, and Camel) because
these are the names of brands and not of separate corporations.
The bill would also have provided additional restrictions on sports
sponsorship. While the bill would have allowed "tombstone '76 advertis-
ing on billboards, it would not allow signs or billboards advertising to-
bacco products to be "located in a sports stadium or other sports
facility."7 7 Trackside advertising, which is one of the main benefits of
sponsoring a race, would thus have been prohibited by this bill.
Finally, H.R. 1250 would have allowed state legislatures to enact
further restrictions on tobacco advertising.78 Thus, the states could ban
even the limited amount of sports sponsorship allowed under the Act.
Both bills were opposed by groups which saw the bills as infringe-
72. H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in Tobacco Issues (Part 1): Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Tobacco Issues].
73. Id. § 3(a)(1).
74. Id § 3(b)(2)(D).
75. Id § 3(b)(2)(F).
76. See Smoking 'Em Out, ECONOMISr, Sept. 15, 1990, at 83 (tombstone advertisements
allow the advertiser to show only the cigarette package). House Bill 1250 would allow these
advertisements only if they consisted of no more than "a picture of a single package of the
tobacco product being advertised displayed against a neutral background." H.IL 1250, supra
note 72, § 3(a)(2)(A)(i). The bill also required that the product package displayed be "no
larger than the actual size of the product package," thus seemingly limiting the effect of a
billboard. Id § 3(a)(2)(A)(iii).
77. H.R. 1250, supra note 72, § 3(a)(2)(A).
78. Id § 4(c).
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ments upon First Amendment rights. 9 An American Civil Liberties
Union spokesperson testified that "[tlhe warning requirements of H.R.
5041 go so far beyond reasonable regulation they impose an unconstitu-
tional burden on the speech chosen by commercial advertisers."80 Tom
Lauria of the Tobacco Institute contended that "[o]ur marketing activity
is clearly protected by the First Amendment."81 However, the extent to
which tobacco advertising is protected by the First Amendment is
controversial.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The proposition that the United States Constitution protects com-
mercial speech was first established in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council in 1976.82 In virginia State Board
of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court struck down, as a violation of the First
Amendment, a Virginia law which provided that pharmacists who adver-
tised "any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms"
for prescription drugs were guilty of unprofessional conduct.3 The
Court held that the First Amendment protects speech which does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction."8  The Court declared
that, "society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commer-
cial information."85 The Court saw a societal interest in ensuring that
decisions made by the public in allocating resources in a free enterprise
economy were "intelligent and well informed."
86
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy may provide protection for to-
bacco advertising. Five years prior to that decision, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in Capital Broadcasting v.
79. Tobacco Bill Unconstitutional, Opponents Tell House Subcommittee, Daily Rep. For
Executives (BNA) No. 135, at A7 (July 13, 1990).
80. Id. (quoting testimony of Barry W. Lynn before the Health Subcomm. of the House
Energy & Commerce Comm.).
81. Jayne O'Donnell, Congressmen Build Names by Raising Health Issues Bills Repeatedly
Introduced, Only to Die in Committee, AUToWEEK, Jan. 14, 1991, at 52.
82. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
83. Id. at 749-50.
84. Id. at 762.
85. Id. at 764. This interest has also been recognized by the EEC. "Advertising that is
honest and fair is not only a service at the disposal of advertisers, but in general also represents
a means of informing consumers, making it easier for them to meet their requirements in terms
of goods and services." Anthony Lester, Written Communication on Advertising and Freedom
of Expression in Europe, in PROC. OF SIXTH INT'L COLLOQUY ABOUT EUR. CONVENTION ON
HUM. RTs. 434, 438 (1985) (quoting Television without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Estab-
lishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting especially by Satellite and Cable,
COM(84)300 at 266).
86. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (1976).
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Mitchell87 declared that, "Congress has the power to prohibit the adver-
tising of cigarettes in any media."8" In Capital Broadcasting, the District
Court held that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did not
violate the First Amendment by prohibiting cigarette advertising on ra-
dio and television. 9 The court saw this ban as being justified by either
"Congress' supervisory role over the federal regulatory agencies or as an
exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce." 9° The court rea-
soned that the "unique characteristics of electronic communication" 91
made it "especially subject to regulation in the public interest."92
Commentators have suggested that had Capital Broadcasting been
decided after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the protection provided
for commercial speech would have required that Capital Broadcasting be
"decided differently, or at least [have] require[d] [a] more specific ration-
ale."93 Judge J. Skelly Wright vigorously dissented in Capital Broadcast-
ing, arguing that the legislation infringed the cigarette companies' free
speech rights because "cigarette advertising implicitly states a position on
a matter of public controversy." 94 In his dissent, Judge Wright argued
that even though "the real 'Marlboro Country' is the graveyard.... the
First Amendment does not protect only speech that is healthy or harm-
less." 95 Judge Wright also expressed concern that banning cigarette ad-
vertisements on television would result in the loss of the anti-smoking
commercials that the networks had been required to run along with the
cigarette ads.96
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York 97 decided in 1980, the Supreme Court created a four-
pronged test to determine the validity of governmental regulation of
commercial speech. In Central Hudson, the Court struck down a regula-
tion banning promotional advertising by an electrical utility.98 As a re-
87. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub nom., Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Acting Attorney-General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
88. Id. at 584.
89. Id. at 583.
90. Id. at 584.
91. Id.
92. I&
93. Gerald J. Thain, Prohibitions on Adertising for Products It Is Legal to Sell: A Consti-
tutionally Valid Option, 3 J. OF PRODucTS L. 83, 93 (1984).
94. Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 587 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting
Banzhafv. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert deniedsub nona., Tobacco Institute v.
F.C.C., 396 U.S. 842 (1969)).
95. Id at 587 (Wright, J., dissenting).
96. Id at 588-89.
97. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
98. Id at 572.
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suit of the fuel shortage of 1973, the Public Service Commission of the
State of New York ordered electrical utilities to cease all advertising
which promoted the use of electricity. 99 The prohibition was extended in
a policy statement issued on February 25, 1977, despite the easing of the
fuel shortage."°° The utility challenged the prohibition in state courts on
the grounds that the regulation violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments by restraining commercial speech.10 1 The state courts up-
held the order of the Commission. 0 2
In overturning the restriction on Central Hudson's advertising, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that, "Commercial expression
not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, 'but also assists con-
sumers and furthers the societal interests in the fullest possible dissemi-
nation of information."' 1 3 The Court did declare, however, that the
Constitution "accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally guaranteed expression."'' 4 The Court first de-
clared that "there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about law-
ful activity."' '  Thus, the first prong of the Central Hudson test requires
that the advertising be truthful and promote a legal product. If this first
prong is not met, the speech can be banned without any further analysis,
The Court declared that where the first prong is satisfied, the analysis
continues to the second prong. For the second prong to be satisfied,
"The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restric-
tions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must
be in proportion to that interest."'0 6 If the first two prongs are satisfied,
the constitutionality of the regulation will be determined by the third and
fourth prongs. The third and fourth prongs ask "whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."'1
0 7
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
10 8
decided in 1986, the Supreme Court interpreted the third prong of the
Central Hudson test to require only that the legislative judgment not be
99. Id. at 558-59.
100. Id. at 559.
101. Id. at 560.
102. Id. at 560-61.
103. Id. at 561-62.
104. Id. at 563.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 564.
107. Id. at 566.
108. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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"manifestly unreasonable."'"° In Posadas, the Supreme Court held that
a Puerto Rican law prohibiting the advertising of casino gambling to Pu-
erto Ricans while allowing advertisements aimed at tourists was constitu-
tional. 10 The Court held that "the greater power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising
of casino gambling."' The Court showed great deference to the legisla-
tive judgment that "advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents
of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product
advertised."' " 2
For a regulation to satisfy the fourth prong, it need not employ the
least restrictive means possible to serve the governmental interest. In
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,'1 3 the
Supreme Court in 1989 upheld a state university regulation prohibiting
the operation of "private commercial enterprises" on university prop-
erty.114 The Court held that the "not more extensive than is necessary"
language of Central Hudson I5 does not require that regulation of speech
be done by the "least restrictive means.""I 6 The Court required a reason-
able" 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accom-
plish those ends." 7 Within those bounds, the Court is willing to "leave
it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation
may best be employed.""' 8
The Central Hudson four pronged test must be applied to determine
whether a ban on tobacco sponsorship would be constitutional. The first
prong requires that the speech must be nondeceptive and about a legal
product. Tobacco is a legal product." 9 However, if the advertising is
inherently deceptive, then it can be banned without further analysis.'
It is argued that tobacco advertising is inherently deceptive because "its
109. Id at 342.
110. Id at 331.
111. Id at 345-46.
112. Id at 342.
113. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
114. Id at 471.
115. See Central Hudson Gas & Elem. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
116. Bd. of Trustees of the State Unin of New York, 492 U.S. at 479.
117. Id at 481 (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
118. Id
119. See eg., 46 U.S.C. § 11103(a)(7) (1988). This law requires that ships carry "a slop
chest containing ... a complete supply of tobacco."
120. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) ("The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it.")
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purpose is to induce people to buy a product that is both harmful and
addictive." '121 Opponents of a ban argue that cigarette advertisements
are no more deceptive than advertisements for other products. 122 While
cigarette ads do not mention the adverse health effects of smoking, except
in the required warning labels, other advertisers such as butter manufac-
turers do not mention the adverse health effects of their products
either. 123 Furthermore, although some commentators see the use of
young healthy models in tobacco advertising as inherently deceptive,124
the tobacco industry denies that the use of these models is deceptive.
The industry states that, "Most persons in their twenties and thirties,
whether smokers or not, look perfectly healthy. The models used in ciga-
rette advertising are not more attractive, healthy or successful looking
than the models used in most advertising."'' 25 One commentator has ar-
gued that a definition of deceptiveness should look at the "potential for a
predetermined and justified criterion percentage of consumers to believe
the claim,... based on their response solely to the conveyed claim"'' 26
and further that "a predetermined substantial number of consumers see-
ing the claim conveyed are unlikely to learn the truth elsewhere .... .127
In light of surveys which show that over ninety percent of Americans are
aware of the relationship between smoking and disease, the argument
that a substantial number of consumers could believe that cigarettes will
make them attractive or healthy is weak. 128 Based on other types of ad-
121. Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First Amendment
Analysis, 17 HoFsTRA L. REv. 99, 113 (1988). See also H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 2(15)
("Through advertisements during and sponsorship of sporting events, tobacco has become
strongly associated with sports and has been deceptively portrayed a. an integral part of sports
and the healthy lifestyle associated with rigorous sporting activity.") See also supra text ac-
companying notes 47-54.
122. Paul J. Weber & Greg Marks, Debate on the Constitutionality and Desirability of a
Tobacco-Products Advertising Ban, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 57, 69 (1988).
123. Id.
124. See, eg., Eisner, supra note 46, at 3.
125. Smoking Prevention Education Act: Hearings on H.R. 1824 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 518 (1983) (comments of the Tobacco Institute on the FTC Staff Report on the Cigarette
Advertising Investigation).
126. Ivan L. Preston, The Definition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other Commercial
Speech, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1035, 1078 (1990).
127. Id.
128. Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 5041 Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 581 (1990) (statement of Gerald M. Goldhaber, Ph.D.). Specifically, these surveys
show that 95% of Americans believe that cigarette smoking increases the risk of lung cancer,
92% believe that it increases the risk of emphysema, and 91% believe it increases the risk of
heart disease. Id. at 582. This can be compared to surveys showing that only 89% of Ameri-
cans could name George Washington as the first president; that in 1976 only 72% of Ameri-
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vertising and the slim likelihood of deception, it is unlikely that the
courts will find cigarette advertising to be inherently deceptive. 1 9
Since "the government interest in minimizing the adverse health ef-
fects of smoking represents a substantial state interest,"' 130 the second
prong of the Central Hudson test as applied to upholding the constitu-
tionality of a ban is easily met. Approximately 350,000 people die annu-
ally in the United States from smoking related diseases.'13  Tobacco has
been described as the "only legal product that is harmful when used as
directed."'' 32 In 1985 the treatment of smoking related diseases cost the
United States an estimated 22 billion dollars, of which the Federal Gov-
ernment paid 4.2 billion dollars. 3 3 The loss of productivity due to smok-
ing related illness and death cost another forty-three billion dollars.13
The death toll and expense seem sufficient to create a substantial govern-
mental interest.
The third prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the ban on
sponsorship be shown to advance the substantial governmental interest in
reducing the use of tobacco.'35 In Central Hudson, the Court stated it
would not "uphold regulations that only indirectly advance[d] the state
interest involved."' 36 The effect of banning tobacco advertising on ciga-
rette consumption is not clear-cut. 137 For example, in 1973 Norway
banned tobacco advertising and promotion. 38 While there was a reduc-
tion in the number of male smokers, the rate for women smokers re-
mained the same and other factors may have accounted for the decrease
in the rate of male smoking. 139 In conjunction with the ban, the Norwe-
cans knew that American independence was declared in 1776; and a 1954 Gallup Poll that
found that only 34% of Amercians knew who had delivered the Sermon on the Mount. Id at
583.
129. See ag., Weber & Marks, supra note 122, at 69.
130. Michael J. Garrison, Should All Cigarette Advertising Be Banned? A First Amendment
and Public Policy Issue, 25 AM. Bus. LJ. 169, 202 (1987).
131. Weber & Marks, supra note 122, at 69.
132. Id.
133. H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 2(5).
134. Id
135. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980).
136. Id.
137. See Tobacco Issues, supra note 72, at 126, (statement of Jean J. Boddewyn, Professor
of Marketing and International Business, New York City University); Cf id at 105 (Tobacco
Advertising: The International Experience, attachment to statement of Scott D. Ballin) (both
Boddewyn and Balin discuss the effect of tobacco advertising bans on consumption in Nor-
way, Finland, and Sweden, but come to opposite conclusions).
138. Weber & Marks, supra note 122, at 70.
139. Id. See also Chapman, supra note 50, at 90-93.
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gian Government instituted programs to educate people about smoking
and to help smokers quit." It is not clear how to evaluate the individual
effect of the advertising ban on smoking.
Moreover, the tobacco companies argue that their advertising is pri-
marily designed to affect the relative market share of the manufac-
turer,141 and that it has no significant effect on aggregate consumption.
142
Les Zuke, director of communications for Phillip Morris, USA, has
stated that, "[a]pproximately 15,000 smokers per day switch cigarette
brands. Our purpose in sponsoring race cars and events is to keep people
already using our brands loyal and to convince others to switch. ' 143 The
proponents of a ban dispute this claim. Emerson Foote, former chair-
man of a leading advertising agency, wrote that:
This is the public position of the tobacco industry but I don't think
anyone really believes this. I am not even convinced that competition
among brands is the most important purpose of such advertising. I
suspect that creating a positive climate of social acceptability for
smoking, which encourages new smokers to join the market, is of
greater importance to the industry.
44
As a further argument against an advertising ban, the tobacco industry
points to the increased cost of advertising after the 1971 ban on broad-
cast advertising and argues that a ban on sponsorship and other forms of
advertising will lead to lower cigarette prices and thus higher consump-
tion.14 5 If this argument were true, however, it would indicate that it is
in the tobacco companies' best economic interests to stop advertising and
so increase consumption.
Under the Posadas standard, a ban on sports sponsorship would not
be a "manifestly unreasonable" approach for Congress to take in at-
tempting to combat smoking. Because Congress has the power to ban
tobacco, it likewise has the power to ban tobacco advertising. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dicta in Posadas suggests that denying the legislature the
power to ban cigarette advertising when they have the power to ban ciga-
rettes completely, "would require more than we find in the First Amend-
140. Weber & Marks, supra note 122, at 70.
141. Garrison, supra note 130, at 202-03. See also Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell, 333 F.
Supp. 582, 588 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
142. Garrison, supra note 130, at 179. See also O'Donnell, supra note 81, at 52. ("[T]hcre
is no evidence to show that when we sponsor an automotive event, it leads people to smoke
... .") (quoting Tom Lauria of the Tobacco Institute).
143. David Phillips, ;vhere There's Smoke: Will Congress Strip Racing of its Tobacco and
Beer Sponsorship Dollars, AUrOWEEK, Jan. 14, 1991, at 49, 50.
144. Chapman, supra note 50, at 85.
145. Garrison, supra note 130, at 181.
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ment." 14  In sum, the ban would likely fulfill the third prong criteria
since Congress has a reasonable and substantial interest in decreasing the
use of tobacco.
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the regu-
lation not be "more extensive than is necessary" 147 to serve the state in-
terest. Proponents of a ban argue that the Government can prove that
numerous less restrictive measures have been unsuccessful in decreasing
smoking. 4 These include the health warnings which are required on
cigarette packages and advertisements1 49 and the complete ban on adver-
tising through the electronic media in effect since 1971.1-1
The position of the proponents of an advertising ban is strengthened
by the Supreme Court's decision in Fox."'1 Because the Court is willing
to "leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of
regulation may best be employed," '52 it is likely that the Court will be
willing to find that the" 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends" is reasonable.1 53
The opponents of a ban argue that a total ban on sponsorship would
be more extensive than is necessary since there are several alternative
approaches. 5' The opponents note that the proposed regulations are
very extensive. Not only would H.R. 5041 have prohibited tobacco com-
panies from sponsoring "any athletic, music, artistic, or other event in the
name of a tobacco product trademark,"1 55 it would also have prohibited
placing tobacco product advertisements in any "facility where sporting
activity is regularly performed,"15 6 or "on cars, boats or other sporting
equipment.' x57  H.R. 1250 would likewise have barred cigarette spon-
sorship signs or billboards "located in a sports stadium or other sports
146. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 347
(1986).
147. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
148. Weber & Marks, supra note 122, at 71. See also Polin, supra note 121, at 133 ("This
operational reality leads to a broader conclusion-a complete ban of tobacco advertising, in all
general forums of communication, is the least restrictive means necessary to serve the govern-
ment interest in the reduction of tobacco use.") (footnote omitted).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1333.
150. Id § 1335.
151. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
152. Id at 481.
153. Id. (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc., 478 U.S. at 341).
154. Garrison, supra note 130, at 204.
155. H.R. 5041, supra note 15, § 6(b)21(2) (emphasis added).
156. Id. § 6(a)(3)(A).
157. Id § 6(a)(3)(B).
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facility,"' 8 as well as prohibiting "displaying the registered brand name
or logo of a tobacco product on cars, boats, animals, or other sporting
equipment."' 59 This regulation would have prevented the owners of pri-
vately owned race tracks and racing vehicles from displaying tobacco
product trademarks even if the event was not televised, and even if only
adults were allowed as spectators.
Given the Supreme Court's deference to legislative judgement, a ban
would probably not be found to be more extensive than necessary and the
fourth prong would be met. Therefore, either of the proposed bills would
likely have passed constitutional muster.
V. OTHER NATIONS' APPROACHES
The approaches that other nations have taken to restrict cigarette
advertising in motorsports is instructive to the development of a United
States law. This Note examines the approaches taken in Canada, Great
Britain, and Australia.
A. Canada
The Canadian law is similar to the proposed Tobacco Control and
Health Protection Act, but goes even further in restricting cigarette ad-
vertising. The Canadian Tobacco Products Control Act declares that
"No person shall advertise any tobacco product offered for sale in Can-
ada."' The law also provides that "No person shall, for consideration,
publish, broadcast or otherwise disseminate, on behalf of another person,
an advertisement for any tobacco product offered for sale in Canada."'
161
The Canadian law does provide an exception for the sponsorship of
sports and cultural activities. The law allows tobacco companies to con-
tinue to sponsor sporting and cultural activities if they do so using "the
full name of a manufacturer or importer of tobacco products."'' 62 Thus,
the sponsorship of a racing series such as the former Rothmans Porsche
Turbo Cup which was named after a cigarette company could continue
while sponsorship of the NASCAR Winston Cup which is named after a
cigarette brand would be banned. This exception is similar to the excep-
tion provided in the Protect Our Children from Cigarettes Act of 1989163
which, if passed, would have forbidden "sponsorships of athletic, artistic,
158. H.R. 1250, supra note 72, § 3(a)(2)(A).
159. Id. § 3(b)(2)(F).
160. Tobacco Products Control Act, ch. 20, § 4(1)(1988).
161. Id. § 4(2).
162. Id. § 6(I).
163. H.R. 1250, supra note 72.
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or other events under the registered brand name of a tobacco product
unless the brand name [was] the name of a corporation in existence on
August 1, 1988." 164 It is unclear how the distinction between brand and
company sponsorship improves upon existing laws.
Under the Canadian Tobacco Products Control Act, the tobacco
companies are also allowed to use the brand name of a tobacco product
provided that it is not used "in association with a tobacco product,"' 6"
and it is "required by the terms of a contract entered into before January
25, 1988." 166 This exception would allow the continuation of an existing
series such as NASCAR Winston Cup which is named for a cigarette
brand if the use is only in connection with the race and not in connection
with Winston cigarettes.
On July 26, 1991, the Quebec Superior Court167 struck down the
Tobacco Products Control Act. 6 ' Justice Jean-Jude Chabot held that
the law violated the tobacco companies' right to freedom of expression
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 69 He further de-
clared that the law denied consumers the right to make their own choices
and that the Government exceeded its authority by trying to regulate
advertising which according to the Charter falls under provincial juris-
diction.' The Canadian Government has appealed this ruling.
17'
Under Quebec civil law, the Act continues in effect and prevents the to-
bacco companies from advertising until after the decision of the appeals
court. 72 It may be as long as four years before there is a decision on the
appeal.
73
The appeals court will have to determine whether the Act violates
the tobacco companies' freedom of expression. The Canadian Supreme
Court follows an approach similar to the Central Hudson four prong test
to determine whether a restriction on advertising violates the freedom
164. Id. § 3(b)(2)(D).
165. Tobacco Products Control Act § 6(1).
166. Id.
167. The Superior Court is an intermediate level provincial court. The judges are federally
appointed. GERALD L. GALL, THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 105 (1977).
168. Quebec Court Strikes Down Canada Ban on Tobacco Advertising, REuTER LiBRARY
REPORT, July 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lbyrpt File.
169. David Vienneau, Can Health Groups Send Tobacco Ad Ruling Up in Smoke?, TO-
RONTO STAR, Aug. 4, 1991, at B4.
170. Id.
171. Gary Regenstreif, Canada to Appeal Ruling Overturning Tobacco Ad Ban, REUTERS,
Aug. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
172. Id
173. Mario Toneguzzi, Tobacco Sponsorship Won't Go Up in Smoke, CALGARY HERALD,
Sept. 17, 1991, at D6.
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guaranteed in the Charter. The Canadian Supreme Court has held, in
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),174 that "there is no sound basis on
which commercial expression can be excluded from the protection of s.
2(b) of the Charter."'175 Some commentators would exclude tobacco ad-
vertising from the protection of section 2(b) of the Charter on any of
three bases: tobacco could be prohibited by the Government, tobacco ad-
vertising encourages illegal conduct, or tobacco advertising is inherently
misleading. 176 If however, tobacco advertising is not excluded from the
protection of section 2(b) and the effect of the law is to restrict the con-
tent of expression, then section 2(b) is violated.
177
The violation of section 2(b) is not sufficient in itself to strike down
the law. Section 1 of the Charter "guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."'178 Before a lim-
itation can be found reasonable, the legislature's objective must be
"pressing and substantial" 17 9 and of "sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom."'' s0 The limita-
tions chosen must be proportional to the objective. This requires that:
[T]he limiting measures must be carefully designed, or rationally con-
nected, to the objective; they must impair the right as little as possible;
and their effects must not so severely trench on individual or group
rights that the legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless
outweighed by the abridgement of rights."'
181
While it seems likely that the Canadian Supreme Court will find that the
legislation's objective is of "substantial importance,"'8 2 the proportional-
ity of the limitations is subject to the same objections as raised under the
third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.'8 3 The final result of
the appeal cannot be predicted.
174. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
175. Id. at 767 (emphasis in original).
176. Rob Cunningham, Note, Cigarette Advertising and Freedom of Expression: The Case
for the Tobacco Products Control Act, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. RE%,. 304, 309 (1990). See also
supra note 145 and accompanying text (argument that advertising for product that could be
made illegal is without constitutional protection); see supra note 63 and accompanying text
(argument that tobacco advertising encourages illegal activity); see supra notes 120-29 and
accompanying text (argument that tobacco advertising is inherently deceptive).
177. Cunningham, supra note 176, at 313-14.
178. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
179. Id. (quoting R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-39).
180. Id. (quoting R. v. Big M Drug Mart, Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 352).
181. Id. (quoting R. v. Edwards Books and Art, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 768).
182. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 135-58 and accompanying text.
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B. Great Britain
Great Britain's regulation of cigarette advertising exemplifies a less
restrictive alternative to Canadian law. The Government and the to-
bacco industry follow the Voluntary Agreement which took effect in Jan-
uary 1987 and was to remain in effect until at least October 31, 1989.1"
The agreement has remained in effect past that termination date.185 The
agreement bans tobacco company sponsorship of "sporting activities
which appeal mainly to spectators under 18. 1' 86 While it is not clear
that motorsports fall within this category, this age requirement has had
the effect of banning tobacco sponsorship of motorsports in Great Brit-
ain.187 Even so, the agreement does not completely ban tobacco com-
pany sponsorship of sporting events.1 8
The tobacco companies also agreed to reduce the annual expendi-
ture on sports sponsorship to 1985 levels and placed a ceiling of twenty
percent of the total expenditures on advertising and promotional activity
related to the sponsorship. 8 9 The agreement further provided that the
content of health warnings in sponsorship advertising be consistent with
other cigarette advertising and increased the size of the warning for tele-
vised events from ten percent to fifteen percent of the sign area. 19°
The compliance with the Voluntary Agreement has not always been
complete. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was criticized in
1990 by the Health Education Authority for showing tobacco company
symbols during the coverage of Grand Prix motor racing.191 In at least
one incident, the crew of a race car sponsored by a tobacco company was
shown wearing clothing with the tobacco company's logo on it.192 This
type of incident could be prevented through the use of strict fines such as
those which are imposed in Germany and Austria.1 93 Typically at Ger-
184. Finsr REPORT, supra note 13, at 11.
185. See 187 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 335 (1991).
186. Voluntary Agreement, supra note 13, § 1.
187. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, SECOND REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE FOR MONITORING AGREEMENTS ON TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND SPONSOR-
SHIP, 10 (1989) [hereinafter SECOND REPORT]. (describing violation by personnel of automo-
bile racing team). See also FIRST REPORT, supra note 13, at 11 (describing breaches in the
agreement involving motocross).
188. SECOND REPORT, supra note 187, at 11-12.
189. Voluntary Agreement, supra note 13, § 2.
190. IaM §3.
191. Celia Hall, Ban on Tobacco Advertising Being "Broken by BBC;" INDEPENDENT, Nov.
7, 1990, at 6.
192. SECOND REPORT, supra note 187, at 10.
193. Shav Glick, Strange Cycle: Lawson, A Celebrity in Europe, Little Known at Home,
L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1986, Sports, at 13. ("The most difficult time is when we go to West
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man and Austrian races, racers sponsored by tobacco companies display
the emblem of the sponsor without the sponsor's name.1 94 While the
Voluntary Agreement has had the effect of banning tobacco sponsorship
of motorsports, it has reduced the pervasiveness of tobacco company
sports sponsorship without complete prohibition.
C. Australia
The Australian state of Victoria has developed another alternative
to a total ban on sponsorship. A regulation promulgated under the To-
bacco Act of 1987195 requires that "every rider, vehicle, or sign with to-
bacco advertising or company colors must also carry a health warning
label 25 percent of the size of the ad." 196 The regulations also limit the
number of signs that can be displayed at a sporting event by tobacco
companies to four and only allows their display during the event and for
the twenty-four hours preceding and following the event. 197 As a further
restriction, both the signs and the tobacco company names or trademarks
must only be visible to "persons to whom the function or event is visi-
ble." '19 These regulations recognize the importance of tobacco company
sponsorship to sporting and cultural activities.1 99 The regulations allow
tobacco companies to continue their participation in sports while both
Germany or Austria and we have to cover all the insignias and names on our equipment
because if we don't it's an automatic $200,000 fine for displaying any tobacco advertising that
could conceivably be seen on television.") (quoting 500cc Motorcycle Road Racing World
Champion, Eddie Lawson).
194. See, ag., SPORT MOTORRAD KATALOG 1989, at 2. (Shoei helmet advertisement show-
ing Eddie Lawson's Marlboro Yamaha in German Grand Prix trim). See also Phillips, supra
note 143, at 49.
195. Tobacco Act 1987, Austl. Acts P., no. 81.
196. David C. Scott, Standing Against Tobacco in TV Sports, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 25, 1989, at 6. The regulation requiring this is based on the Tobacco Act 1987, section 10
which allows sponsorship only if it is restricted to the trademark or name of the tobacco
product and is done in accordance with regulations regarding signs at the site of the event. The
regulation provides that:
In the case of a display of a tobacco trademark or name on the outside of any road,
sea or air vehicle used in a function or event or on any participant ... must be...
accompanied by a prescribed statement, the area of which is not less than 25 per
centum of the area of the tobacco trademark or name... and otherwise no less
visible than the tobacco trademark or name ....
Tobacco (Promotion of Exempt Sponsorship) Regulations 1989, S.R. 179, § 7(b)(i).
197. Tobacco (Promotion of Exempt Sponsorship) Regulations 1989, §§ 7(a)(ii), 7(a)(iv).
198. Id. §§ 7(a)(v), 7(b)(ii).
199. HEALTH DEPARTMENT, VICTORIA, TOBACCO REGULATIONS & SPONSORSHIPS:
WHAT Do THEY MEAN FOR SPORT? 3 (1990) [hereinafter TOBACCO REGULATIONS &
SPONSORSHIP].
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limiting their effect and insuring that the government health warning is
presented along with the sponsors advertising.
The Tobacco Act of 1987 also provides an alternative to tobacco
company funding of sporting activities. The Victorian Health Promotion
Foundation is empowered to "provide sponsorship for sporting or cul-
tural activities." 2°° The Foundation buys out existing tobacco company
sponsorships and provides funds to sports that do not receive tobacco
company sponsorships.0 1 The Foundation is funded through a five per-
cent tax on the sale of wholesale tobacco products.2"' The Foundation is
required by law to pay at least thirty percent of this fund to sporting
organizations.2 "3 This approach seems to be the best compromise be-
tween the governmental interest in discouraging tobacco use and the free
speech interests of the tobacco companies and motorsports participants.
VI. EFFECT ON MOTORSPORTS OF A UNITED
STATES BAN ON SPONSORSHIP BY TOBACCO
COMPANIES
A ban on tobacco sports sponsorship would cost American motor-
sports about seventy-five million dollars per year,2G1 which is the approx-
imate amount that tobacco companies spend in the United States on
motorsports competition.20 5 The loss of this money could seriously re-
duce the amount of prize money at races and hurt the individual race
teams that depend on tobacco sponsorship. When Camel cigarettes
stopped sponsoring the IMSA GTO/GTU racing series in 1989, it took
two racing seasons before IMSA was able to find a new sponsor." 6
In the short term, withdrawal of tobacco sponsorship money is
likely to hurt motorsports.20 7 Beer company sponsorship may replace
some of the tobacco company sponsorship money. However, there is
also a movement to ban beer sponsorship of racing.20 That movement
wants to put "an end to the systematic industry practices which
200. Tobacco Act 1987, § 18(c).
201. TOBACCO REGULATIONS & SPONSORSHIP, supra note 199, at 3.
202. Id
203. Tobacco Act 1987, § 32(4)(a).
204. Ingram, supra note 38, at 50.
205. Idr
206. Camel withdrew their sponsorship in January 1989 and a new sponsor was not found
until November 1990. See Is That One Hump or To? Camel Commits to GTP But 0 and U
Need Sponsor, AUTOWEEK, Jan. 9, 1989, at 59. See also Full Chat: Exxon Backs GTO/U
Series, ON TRACK, Nov. 29, 1990, at 9.
207. Ingram, supra note 38, at 51.
208. Phillips, supra note 143, at 49.
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strengthen linkages between beer and fast cars." '20 9
The long term effects of a sponsorship ban in the United States have
not yet been assessed.210 It seems likely, however, that motorsports will
survive a ban on cigarette sponsorship and that other sponsors will step
in to replace the tobacco companies.2" Some of the new sponsors may
even be other products of the tobacco companies. For example, R.J.
Reynolds' 1988 contract with NASCAR reportedly contains a "golden
parachute" clause providing that R.J. Reynolds will continue to pay
NASCAR fifteen million dollars per year in the event that they withdraw
their sponsorship of the Winston Cup series.212 It seems likely that
should the government prohibit Winston from sponsoring the series, one
of the other RJR/Nabisco subsidiaries, such as Planters or LifeSavers
would continue the contract.21 3
In other countries, it is predicted that a ban on tobacco company
sponsorship of motorsports would be disasterous. Alain Prost, the all
time leader in Formula One victories, stated that a proposed French ban
on tobacco sponsorship would "be a catastrophe" for racing.214 A
spokesperson for the French Motorcycling Federation said that, "Ban-
ning advertising for tobacco brands would deprive motorcycling of more
than 100 million francs (18 million dollars) of revenue. ' 215  Cigarette
companies are estimated to contribute sixty-one million dollars to all
forms of motorsports in France.21 6 One British commentator has ques-
tioned, however, whether "sport or the arts would collapse without to-
bacco funding, because only around 15 percent of sports sponsorship
comes from tobacco and drink combined.
'217
The replacement of sponsorship money provided by the tobacco
companies would be difficult. In France, Jean-Marie Balestre, the presi-
209. Id. This relationship in the public mind between racing and automobile accidents
may have caused Dominos Pizza to stop its Indy car sponsorship the year after Aric Luycndyk
won the Indianapolis 500 in a Dominos sponsored car. Dominos was apparently concerned
with bad publicity about fatal accidents related to their thirty minute delivery policy and did
not want to be associated with racing anymore. Marissa Silvera, It's a Run for the Money;
Even Top Indy-Car Racers Need Plenty of Cash to Succeed, NEWSDAY, July 13, 1991, at 96.
210. See Letter from Phillip D. Havens, Office of the General Counsel, NASCAR, to au-
thor (Sept. 17, 1990) (on file with Hastings Int'l & Comp. L Rev.) ("We have not had occasion
to assess the long term impacts of a partial or total television advertising ban at this point.").
211. TURNER, supra note 45, at 15. See also Ingram, supra note 38, at 51.
212. Phillips, supra note 143, at 49.
213. Id.
214. Wrong, supra note 14.
215. Id. (quoting Marc Fontan).
216. Id.
217. TURNER, supra note 45, at 15.
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dent of the International Motor Sports Federation (FISA), the sanction-
ing body for Formula One, declared that the French government would
have to make up the shortfall if tobacco sponsorship ends.218 Govern-
ment sponsorship is not a likely solution in the United States.219
Despite the anguished cries of disaster from Europe, it is not likely
that an end of tobacco sponsorship would bring with it an end to motor-
sports. Motorsports were popular long before the ban on televised ciga-
rette advertising brought on the current level of tobacco company
involvement in motorsports.22 This popularity will commend the sport
to sponsors even should tobacco be completely barred from participation.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO A TOTAL BAN ON
ADVERTISING IN THE UNITED STATES
There are several alternatives that would make a total ban on to-
bacco company sports sponsorship unnecessary. Members of Congress
have proposed that the United States require warnings on all broadcast
and print advertising of alcohol and tobacco products similar to those
required in Victoria." A spokesman for the United States Beer Institute
opposed this proposal saying, "Taken loosely, it means there would have
to be warning messages on anything from sports cars to golf balls [that
appear on television broadcasts]. It's very unlikely that our members
would continue to do any broadcast advertising."'  Likewise, Tom
Lauria of the Tobacco Institute opposed the proposal saying "Nobody is
going to pay for a 30-second advertisement if they have to do a 15-second
218. Wrong, supra note 14.
219. Although governmental support is not likely, some governmental involvement is pos-
sible. The United States Postal Service is currently a sponsor of the 1992 Olympics. Michael
Otten, Runners Love Carrying a Torch. Journey ofl 700 Miles Begins This Weekend on Capitol
Steps, SACRAMENTO UNION, June 12, 1991 (reprinted in UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
DAILY NEws DIGEST (June 25, 1991)). At the 1991 Daytona 500 each of the five branches of
the United States military was represented by a car in the race. Beth Tuschak & Jerry Potter,
Daytona Racers Join Forces to Honor US. Armed Forces, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 1991, Sports, at
1C. This sponsorship was more apparent than real. NASCAR, Daytona International Speed-
way, and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco provided the financing for "Operation Desert Support" or-
ganized by driver Greg Sacks. Id The participants were Greg Sacks in a blue and white
Chevrolet representing the Navy; Buddy Baker in a red and blue Pontiac representing the
Marines; Mickey Gibbs in a silver, blue, and red Pontiac representing the Air Force; Dave
Marcis in a blue, orange, and white Chevrolet representing the Coast Guard; and Alan
Kulwicki in a black and desert camouflage colored Ford representing the Army. Id.
220. The seventy-sixth running of the Indianapolis 500 will be held on Memorial Day, May
24, 1992.
221. O'Donnell, supra note 81, at 52.
222. Id
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warning.
' 2 2 3
A restriction on the amount of time that tobacco company sponsor-
ship messages can be seen on television is an approach which would re-
duce the pervasiveness of the sponsorship on television while still
allowing the message to be presented to those who are present at the
event. Those present at the event can avoid looking at the tobacco com-
pany sponsorship material, while those watching on televison have only
the view provided by the broadcaster.
Counter-advertising is another alternative to a total ban on sponsor-
ship. Counter-advertising involves running anti-smoking advertisements
to counter the effect of cigarette advertisements. In 1967 the F.C.C. in-
stituted a policy requiring that television stations provide free air time to
anti-smoking proponents under the "fairness doctrine. ' 224 This counter-
advertising policy was approved by the courts in Banzhaf v. F C. C. 225 In
Banzhaf, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that "cigarette advertising in general,... necessarily conveys the contro-
versial view that smoking is a good thing, ' 226 and that therefore, the
F.C.C. had the power to require broadcasters to "devote a significant
amount of broadcast time to presenting the case against cigarette smok-
ing."227 The F.C.C. ruling provided for approximately one anti-smoking
commercial for every six cigarette commercials shown. 228 These
counter-advertisements were very successful in reducing the numbers of
people smoking.229 In the wake of this counter-advertising, the cigarette
223. Id.
224. Garrison, supra note 130, at 173. The fairness doctrine "imposes affirmative responsi-
bilities on the broadcaster to provide coverage of issues of public importance which is adequate
and which fairly reflects differing viewpoints." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 537 (5th ed.
1979). The requirement of "fair and balanced presentation of controversial issues of public
importance" predates the existence of the F.C.C.. Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082, 1092
n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. F.C.C., 396 U.S. 842
(1969). The F.C.C. has abandoned the fairness doctrine as no longer serving the public inter-
est. This abandonment was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in Syracuse Peace Council v. F.C.C.,
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
225. 405 F.2d 1082.
226. Id. at 1087 (emphasis in original).
227. Id. at 1085.
228. Thain, supra note 93, at 91.
229. Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissent-
ing) ("In the immediate wake of Banzhaf, the broadcast media were flooded with exceedingly
effective anti-smoking commercials. For the first time in years, the statistics began to show a
sustained trend toward lesser cigarette consumption. The Banzhaf advertising ... cost the
cigarette companies customers .... Id. at 587-88 (citation ommitted)). In April 1990, Cali-
fornia began to sponsor anti-smoking public service announcements to favorable public re-
sponse. Luken Lights Up Hearing, supra note 9, at 55 (citing an eight-to-one favorable
response to the advertisements).
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companies suggested that the Senate "draft legislation permitting the
companies to remove their advertisements from the air."0 Some have
speculated that the tobacco industry agreed to the 1969 ban on broadcast
advertisements to do away with the counter-advertisements required by
Banzhaf. 1 The practical effect of the Congressional ban on radio and
television advertising was to eliminate the counter-advertisements.332
Although required time restrictions, counter-advertising, and health
warnings could cause a withdrawal of tobacco company sponsorships
from sports,233 they would also reduce the pervasiveness of tobacco spon-
sorship without the extensive restrictions on commercial speech pro-
posed by H.R. 5041 and H.R. 1250.
Because of the Supreme Court's willingness to allow restrictions on
commercial speech as exemplified in Fox, which only required that the fit
between the legislature's means and ends be "reasonable,"' 23 it is likely
that an advertising ban would satisfy the fourth prong of Central Hudson
and thus pass constitutional muster. The presence of alternatives to a
total ban is not likely to affect this analysis. According to Posadas, a ban
on advertising is not too restrictive even when the same end can be
achieved through counter-advertising.235 In Posadas, the Supreme Court
deferred to the legislature's determination that a counter-speech policy
would not be as effective as a restriction on advertising. 6
It seems likely that the Supreme Court would also defer to a legisla-
tive judgment that time restrictions, counter-advertising, and health
warnings could not replace a total ban on sponsorship. Nevertheless,
should the Court determine that the availability of these alternatives
230. Capital Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 588.
231. Gregory T. Wuliger, The Constitutional Rights of Puffery: Commercial Speech and the
Cigarette Broadcast Advertising Ban, 36 FED. COMM. LU. 1, 21 (1983) (citing Capital Broad-
casting, 333 F. Supp. at 587-89 (Wright, J., dissenting)).
232. Garrison, supra note 130, at 174.
233. Requiring warnings and counter-advertisements may very well not cause tobacco
companies to stop sponsoring motorsports. Phillip Morris has agreed to place anti-smoking
advertisements in the New York area in connection with its sponsorship of the Marlboro
Grand Prix Indy car race. Anti-Smoking Ads, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1992, at B3. Phillip Morris
stated that these advertisements would be 30% of the total Marlboro advertising used in the
New York area before the race. Id Marlboro has also stated that it will run ads warning
children not to smoke in the program for the Long Beach Grand Prix Indy Car race.
Horovitz, supra note 38. The effectiveness of cigarette company sponsored counter-advertising
has been questioned by Joseph W. Cherner of SmokeFree Educational Services who stated
that, "Trusting Phillip Morris to educate our children about the dangers of cigarettes is like
trusting the Ku Klux Klan to educate young people about racial harmony." Id.
234. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989).
235. Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986).
236. Id.
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makes a total ban unreasonable, the fourth prong of Central Hudson will
not be satisfied and so a ban would not meet the constitutional require-
ments of the First Amendment.
VIII. PROPOSAL
Even should the Court hold that a total ban is constitutional, such a
ban would not be the best approach to dealing with the problem. A ban
on tobacco company sports sponsorship is not needed because of the
availability of alterative means to reduce tobacco addiction without the
restrictions on commercial speech such a ban would cause.
First, Congress should pass a law, similar to that of Victoria, Aus-
tralia, requiring that all tobacco sponsorship materials-race cars, hel-
mets, and trackside billboards-carry warning labels where the word
"WARNING" is as visible during the race as the name of the tobacco
product being advertised. Although the tobacco companies would likely
oppose this warning label, as they did in Victoria when the warning was
required there,23 7 it seems probable that the tobacco companies would
display warnings rather than be banned from sponsorship of
motorsports.
Second, Congress should also limit the percentage of time that to-
bacco company names and logos can be show on television during a race.
The main effect of the German and Austrian laws, as well as the British
Voluntary Agreement, has been to reduce the visibility of tobacco com-
pany advertising while still allowing the tobacco companies to participate
in motorsports. Tobacco company names and logos should not be recog-
nizable on camera during more than a given percentage of the race such
as fifteen percent.
Third, Congress should require mandatory anti-smoking commer-
cials during televised events with significant tobacco company involve-
ment. The tobacco company involvement could be measured by the
amount of time tobacco company names and logos are visible during the
race. The greater the percentage of time tobacco company names and
logos are visible, the more counter-advertising required. Thus, under
this proposal, a Formula One race with large amounts of Marlboro and
Camel cigarette involvement would be required to show more anti-smok-
ing commercials than an amateur sports car race where one driver might
have a cigarette company sponsor.
237. Scott, supra note 196, at 6.
[Vol. 15
200 MPH Cigarette Ads
IX. CONCLUSION
Motorsports give pleasure to millions of spectators in the United
States and throughout the world. Tobacco is a legal product which kills
millions of people throughout the world. Tobacco company sponsorship
of motorsports links the pleasure and the death. Tobacco sponsorship of
motorsports is one of many ways that tobacco companies advertise their
products. Sponsorship allows the companies to circumvent the ban on
television advertising of tobacco products. The proponents of a ban on
tobacco sponsorship contend that this sponsorship is aimed directly at
teenagers who are the group most likely to begin smoking. The tobacco
companies dispute this contention and state that their advertising is
aimed solely at people who already smoke as a way to encourage smokers
to change brands.
Tobacco sponsorship benefits motorsports as well as the tobacco
companies. The tobacco companies provide millions of dollars in prize
money and in support of the teams in motorsports. This money has
brought tremendous technological development in its wake. Without
this money, most race teams will be unable to continue their present level
of expenditure on equipment and personnel. It would likely be many
years before motorsports would recover from a complete loss of tobacco
company sponsorship money.
There have been several proposals to ban tobacco sports sponsor-
ships in the United States and other countries. These proposals typically
deny tobacco companies the right to sponsor sports or cultural activities
in the name of cigarette brands, but allow tobacco companies to sponsor
activities under their corporation's name.
The tobacco companies contend that these bans would violate their
First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The constitutionality of
the proposed bans must be gauged by the less protective standards af-
forded to commercial speech regulation. The test for the validity of a
regulation restricting commercial speech is the four pronged test estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York. Given the current interpreta-
tion of this standard, a complete ban on sports sponsorship is likely to be
found constitutional.
However, even if a ban is constitutional, it is not the best solution to
the problem. There are several less restrictive alternatives available
which should be pursued before a complete ban is enacted. These alter-
natives include restrictions on the amount of time tobacco company
logos can be shown during races, requiring counter-advertising to be
19921
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shown during televised coverage of events with a significant level of to-
bacco company sponsorship, and mandatory display of warning labels on
cars and trackside billboards. When the uncertainty of any benefit from
the ban is weighed against the restriction on the speech of the tobacco
companies, and the damage to motorsports, these less restrictive alterna-
tives must be tried before the United States enacts a complete ban.
